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Abstract 
Previous research has found differential neural processing to racial ingroup and outgroup faces  
and greater neural processing for individuals who violate social expectations in the early 
attentional components of the ERP. Other lines of research using behavioral paradigms and fMRI 
methodology have demonstrated the ability of minimal group assignment to override race 
effects. This research sought to combine these lines of research to investigate the effects of an 
arbitrary group membership on attention in a racial expectancy violation paradigm, as measured 
by P2 amplitude. Hypotheses were generally unsupported but two effects were found that merit 
discussion. That is, we replicated previous person perception research by showing that 
participants show larger P2 amplitudes to racial outgroup members and extended the minimal 
groups literature by showing that racially stereotypical minimal outgroup targets elicit more P2 
processing than other combinations. Limitations, implications and future directions are 
discussed. 
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Introduction 
 Social categorization is crucial in person perception. Because the brain is limited in its 
cognitive capacity, categorical thinking helps us order and make sense of the world 
(Bodenhausen, 1990; Fiske & Taylor, 1991;	  Fiske, 1998). The activation of structured schemas, 
or sets of learned information about particular groups, allows us to rapidly process social 
information (Fiske, 1998; Moscovici, 1984). These schemas become automatically activated in 
person perception when we attend to cues (e.g., skin color) in other people that identify the social 
categories to which they belong (e.g., race). When activated, the information associated with 
these schemas becomes salient, such as stereotypes associated with group membership (e.g., 
“Blacks are athletic”). Stereotypes then may direct subsequent cognitions and behaviors (Fiske & 
Neuberg, 1990; Hogg, 2004; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). Social categorization can 
thus have a number of consequences, such as individuals behaving more favorably and allotting 
more resources to members of the group with which they identify (i.e., “ingroup”) relative to 
outgroup members, a phenomenon termed ingroup favoritism (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). People 
also tend to overemphasize intergroup differences, leading to the outgroup homogeneity effect in 
which outgroup members are viewed as sharing central tendencies while ingroup members are 
individuated (e.g., Tajfel, 1969). Stereotype activation can also have consequences for behavior 
(Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996) such that individuals identify words consistent with Black 
stereotypes (e.g., violent, lazy) more quickly when the ‘Black’ category is activated in memory 
than when the ‘White’ category is activated (e.g., Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). 
Stereotype activation can also have negative consequences in situations such as an employer 
interviewing Black candidates (Jussim, Palumbo, Smith, & Madon, 2000) or a police officer 
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deciding whether or not to shoot a Black suspect (Correll, Park, Wittenbrink, & Judd, 2002; 
Payne, 2001). Thus, the automatic process of social categorization can lead to downstream 
consequences such as individuals perceiving and behaving towards outgroup members in a way 
that is consistent with learned stereotypes.  
Race  
 Perhaps no social grouping in America has been more salient than race, given how 
replete our history is with racial division. Accordingly, a significant body of research has 
examined how race cues can lead to race-related cognitions, such as how automatic racial 
categorization can lead to differential processing of racial ingroup and outgroup members 
extremely quickly after viewing a target. Most of this research has focused on the processing of 
racial ingroup and outgroup faces, given their inherent social nature and the amount of social 
information conveyed in them. Due to the automatic nature of social categorization and the fact 
that self-report measures assess more controlled processes and are affected by participants’ 
conscious motives, such as maintaining social desirability (e,g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000), 
more implicit measures have been used. For example, the dot-probe task measures how quickly 
participants react to the location of a dot after it replaces one of several simultaneously presented 
stimuli, giving an index of attentional bias (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). A relatively 
shorter mean response latency in dot detection suggests that participants had been attending to 
the stimulus that was just obscuring it. When used to measure attention to Black versus White 
faces among White perceivers, researchers found faster reaction times when the dot was 
presented on the same side as a Black face, which was interpreted as an attendance to potential 
threat (Trawalter, Todd, Baird, & Richeson, 2008). Behavioral measures, however, also have 
limitations in that they are dependent on the speed of motor processes and task requirements 
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(Bartholow, Dickter, & Sestir, 2006;	  Ito & Cacioppo, 2000). In addition, the underlying 
cognitive processes can be obscure and interpretation of results may be difficult (Brunel, Tietje 
& Greenwald, 2004). Given these considerations, research has gradually moved towards 
incorporating physiological measures in the study of social categorization.  
 One such method, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), can elucidate the 
neurological underpinnings of social categorization. Its spatial precision in measuring blood flow 
in the brain, which is related to neuronal activity, allows the imaging of neural networks 
involved in social cognitive processes. For example, one fMRI study has shown heightened 
activity in the fusiform face area (FFA) when Black and White participants are shown own-race 
faces relative to other-race faces (Golby, Gabrieli, Chiao & Eberhardt, 2001). As the FFA has 
been implicated in individuating faces (Rhodes, Byatt, Michie, & Puce, 2004) and perceptual 
expertise (Gaulthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski & Gore, 1999), the authors suggested this 
activation reflected greater familiarity with own race faces. The researchers also found that the 
level of activation positively correlated with the degree of memory for own race versus other 
race faces, suggesting that the observed differential neural activation contributes to the often 
found same race memory bias. In another fMRI study, the processing of Black and White faces 
in the fusiform face area (FFA) was related to levels of implicit racial bias, implying that racial 
bias decreases the similarity in neural representations of racial ingroup and outgroup members 
(Brosch, Bar-David and Phelps, 2013), which may bias the perception of Black and White faces.  
 Similarly, another fMRI study also found that implicit racial bias modulates activity in 
another brain region. Researchers found greater amygdala activation when White participants 
viewed Black faces relative to White faces with a more pronounced difference in participants 
with higher levels of implicit racial bias (Cunningham et al., 2004). The likely function of the 
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amygdala, a structure located in the anterior medial temporal lobe, is to detect ambiguous 
sources of information and then allocate resources (Barrett, et al., 2007) and it has been 
implicated in emotional processing (Phelps & LeDoux, 2005). Since behavioral research has 
indicated that Blacks may be viewed as threatening to Whites (Payne, 2001; Correl, Park, Judd & 
Wittenbrink, 2007), this fMRI research suggests neural regions and cognitive processes that may 
underlie these sorts of behavioral responses.  
 These differences in neural activation may also be modulated by goals in social 
interactions. Research has demonstrated differences in neural activity when participants are 
tasked with the social categorization or individuation of racial ingroup and outgroup targets 
(Wheeler & Fiske, 2005). When White participants racially categorize Black faces, the amygdala 
shows a heightened response and greater stereotype activation, as measured by lexical priming, 
relative to when the participants are instead tasked to individuate the Black targets (Wheeler & 
Fiske, 2005). These results suggest that the explicit task of individuating other-race individuals 
can alter brain activity and stereotype activation, demonstrating the goal dependence and 
malleability of these processes.  
 While fMRI research has been helpful in demonstrating some of the neural substrates of 
person perception, it has limitations. Due to its lack of temporal acuity, it cannot neatly provide 
precise temporal measurements of the neural processing of faces, since fMRI images brain 
activity on the scale of seconds and much of early face processing occurs on the scale of 
milliseconds. In contrast, electroencephalography (EEG) can precisely identify the time course 
of social categorization (Fabiani & Donchin, 1995), allowing the early cognitive processes of 
person perception to be studied. In EEG recordings, electrodes are placed upon the scalp to 
measure the electrical activity of populations of cortical neurons. The event-related potential 
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(ERP) technique uses EEG signals time-locked to stimulus presentation in order to provide a 
neural index of a cognitive process specific to the type of stimulus presented (Cacioppo, Crites, 
Gardner, & Berntson, 1994; Stern, Ray, & Quigley, 2001).   
 Research using ERPs has found racial ingroup/outgroup effects in the N1, P2 and N2 
components, which occur if the participant is explicitly instructed to attend to race or not (for a 
review, see Ito & Bartholow, 2009). The N1 and the P2 are both implicated in the engagement of 
attentional resources and are typically larger to racial outgroup than ingroup members, 
suggesting an early process for directing attentional resources towards outgroup members 
relative to ingroup members. The N2, also an attentional component, shows larger amplitudes to 
racial ingroup faces compared to racial outgroup faces (Dickter & Bartholow, 2007). As larger 
differences in early ingroup versus outgroup attention, as reflected in N2 processing, has also 
been related to better ingroup categorization (Dickter & Bartholow, 2007), this early 
differentiation may have a role in distinguishing ingroup and outgroup members. This process 
may also have a functional role in directing other person perception processes and behavioral 
responses. For example, White individuals who exhibit larger P2 and N2 responses to Black 
targets are more likely to view as a Black male as holding a gun rather than a tool in simulations 
(Correll, 2006), suggesting that early neural differentiation of Black and White faces may elicit 
stereotypes which then may bias behavioral responses. ERP research such as this reveals that 
very early on in person perception, processes are activated that are sensitive to racial ingroup and 
outgroup membership, which may in turn guide future cognitions and behaviors.  
Social expectancy violations  
 While social categorization shapes our interactions with social targets by leading us to 
expect stereotyped information, the social mind is also capable of processing situations involving 
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schema-violating information, which may require novel behavioral responses (Macrae et al., 
1999). In order to reveal the cognitive processes involved in a schema violation, research has 
examined what happens both behaviorally and neurally when there is incongruence between 
social expectations and reality. Learning that individuals violate expectations by behaving in a 
manner inconsistent with stereotypes leads perceivers to experience heightened arousal (Jussim, 
Coleman & Lerch, 1987) and make more extreme evaluations of targets who violate 
expectancies (Bettencourt, Dill, Greathouse, Charlton, & Mulholland, 1997). Individuals also 
show greater working memory load (Stern, Marrs, Millar, & Cole, 1984) and better memory for 
targets exhibiting stereotype-violating behavior, suggesting more cognitive processing is 
recruited for expectancy incongruent information (Stern, Marrs, Millar, & Cole, 1984). It seems 
that when perceivers encounter people who act in nonstereotypic ways, individuating processes 
are activated which may have downstream cognitive and behavioral consequences.  
 One fMRI investigation (Cloutier et al., 2011) examining social expectancy violations used 
targets who differed based on political party (Democrat and Republican) who were described as 
holding views that were stereotypical or nonstereotypical of their political affiliation. The 
bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), both regions 
previously found to be involved in mentalizing about others, were found to be preferentially 
engaged when targets violated expectations based on political affiliation. Both areas are broadly 
implicated in social cognition, but specifically the TPJ has been found to be involved in 
attributing mental states to others (Saxe & Wexler, 2005), with damage to this area impairing 
performance on Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks (Samson et al., 2004), while the MPFC has been 
implicated in impression formation (Mitchell et al., 2004) and ToM (Frith & Frith, 2006). These 
findings suggest overlap between neural networks involved in mentalizing about others and in 
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the individuation of targets, supporting the notion that social expectancy violating targets recruit 
neural systems that rapidly act to create individuated impressions.  
 Dickter and Gyurovski (2012) used a similar impression formation task in an ERP study to 
help elucidate the early processes underlying person perception when targets violate expectations 
based on racial stereotypes. White participants viewed sentences describing positive and negative 
behaviors stereotypical of a White person or a Black person, which were designed and tested in a 
series of pilot studies to elicit a social expectation for the target that followed. Thus, there were 
four classes of statements: Black stereotypical negative, Black stereotypical positive, White 
stereotypical negative and White stereotypical positive. After sentence presentation, a face of a 
Black male or a White male was presented; the faces were matched on attractiveness, age and 
stereotypicality. These targets either confirmed (e.g., Black stereotype-Black face) or violated 
(e.g., Black stereotype-White face) expectations based on racial stereotypes. The researchers 
found that the amplitudes of the N1, P2 and N2 components in response to Black and White male 
faces were moderated by the impressions formed prior to target presentation. The N1 showed a 
larger amplitude when a White face followed a negative impression and when a Black face 
followed a positive impression. The N2 was larger when a White face followed a Black 
stereotypic and/or negative impression, suggesting that expectancy violations demand more 
attention when ingroup members are seen negatively or as demonstrating outgroup 
characteristics. The N1 and N2 results both suggest that more early attention is allocated in trials 
involving expectancy violations rather than expectancy confirmations, indicating that individuals 
attend to stereotype violating targets more quickly and on a deeper neural level than stereotype 
confirming targets. The P2 component had the largest effect when Black faces followed 
stereotypically Black behaviors, supporting the theory that the P2 component reflects racial 
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outgroup processing (Dickter & Bartholow, 2007) and possibly the perception of social threat 
(Schutter, de Haan, & van Honk, 2004). As social expectations may function as a threat 
preventer by leading perceivers to avoid potentially dangerous individuals (Olson, Roese, & 
Zanna, 1996), it may be that outgroup faces are processed as more threatening when they seem to 
conform to outgroup stereotypical behavior. The Cloutier et al. (2011) and Dickter and 
Gyurovski (2012) studies together suggest that early neural attention is directed differentially to 
individuals based on the stereotypic consistency of information presented about them as well as 
their racial ingroup or outgroup status, offering an important avenue of research into person 
perception. This suggests that facial perception is modulated by the content of the social 
information available about the target, showing that even something so basic as perceiving a face 
can be affected by social expectations. 
Minimal groups 
 While standing social categories such as race can evoke ingroup and outgroup 
distinctions and lead to differential processing, experimentally induced and mutually exclusive 
groups (e.g., minimal group assignments) are also sufficient to introduce processing differences 
between minimal groups, suggesting that prior ingroup contact and resource competition are 
unnecessary for group bias (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971). This implies that humans 
quickly and flexibly self-categorize into social groupings such that even low-level person 
perception is informed by group identity. Research into the cognitive basis of face perception has 
begun to elucidate how group membership is processed, with a burgeoning body of research 
suggesting that many effects previously thought to be unique to socially defined ingroups and 
outgroups such as race can be replicated with minimal group paradigms.  
	   11	  
 Research has suggested that basic recall of a target’s race can be moderated by minimal 
group membership (Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001). In two experiments, participants were 
instructed to form impressions of individuals holding a conversation. The cues to group 
membership were strictly conversational in the first study, with the conversers indicating the 
group to which they were affiliated by how they spoke to one another. In the second study the 
cues were both conversational and based on a cue related to dress appearance (shirt color). At the 
end of the conversation, a surprise recall task was administered in which participants were tested 
on the memory of race and group membership. In Study One, participants remembered race and 
group membership at about the same level but in Study Two, where style of dress was indicative 
of affiliation, group membership was remembered at a similar level to Study One while recall of 
race was significantly worse (Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001). Similarly, ingroup faces are 
remembered better than outgroup faces whether the group distinction is university affiliation or 
an arbitrarily assigned personality type (Bernstein, Young & Hugenberg, 2007). Fear 
conditioning also can be affected by group membership. When participants were assigned a 
colored t-shirt for their performance on a color perception task, negative associations were more 
easily established for targets wearing the opposite color than targets wearing the same color as 
the participant (Navarette et al., 2012). Thus, when group membership for other minimal groups 
is salient, biases for social groups such as race can be moderated, suggesting that minimal group 
membership can supersede race in categorical importance and processing.  
 These results suggest that differential processing of racial ingroup and outgroup faces 
reflect basic group recognition processes that are not specific to race and that the simple act of 
social affiliation can bias our perceptual systems. Indeed, an fMRI study used mixed-race 
minimal groups to examine the neural substrates underlying facial recognition (Van Bavel, 
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Packer, & Cunningham, 2008). They informed participants that they had been assigned to one of 
two groups, the Leopards or Tigers, and that it was important to learn the members of their team 
and the competing team prior to the study. After the learning task, participants completed a facial 
categorization task. The researchers found that ingroup faces recruited greater activation in the 
amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, dorsal striatum and FFA. As the effects were not moderated by 
race, this pattern of FFA activation, similar to previous work by Golby et al. (2001), may reflect 
ingroup attentional biases or greater ingroup member individuation rather than perceptual 
expertise (Van Bavel et al., 2008). Furthermore, the tendency seems to be perceptually 
automatic, since Van Bavel et al. found that task demands did not moderate the effects.  
 ERP research has shown that minimal groups can elicit neural differences very early on 
in facial processing. A study by Ratner and Amodio (2013) asked participants to complete a dot 
estimation task, in which they were to estimate the number of dots on an array of images. 
Participants were told that their group membership was based on their performance on the task, 
but were randomly classified as being either an overestimator or underestimator, which they 
were told related to personality characteristics. Participants then categorized a set of faces as 
being either overestimators or underestimators according to background color. The researchers 
found that ingroup members, as defined by targets who possessed the same estimator label as the 
participant, elicited greater N170 amplitudes after facial presentation, a component thought to be 
related to facial structural encoding (Ratner & Amodio, 2013), suggesting that a minimal ingroup 
is sufficient to induce differential facial processing very early on in person perception.  
 Taken together, these studies suggest that previously found race effects may be the result 
of a broad psychological system based upon categorical distinctions, rather than an effect 
specific to race. They also suggest that race effects in social categorization may often be 
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supplanted by basic group affiliations, even during low-level perceptual processes. Given the 
importance of race and other deeply embedded social distinctions in guiding social behaviors, the 
ease with which a minimal group can recruit similar neural processes and become the dominant 
social category by which we process individuals suggests a greater need for research in these 
basic person perception processes. By examining early attention to faces that differ on race, 
group affiliation and behavior, we can better understand what social cues drive social 
categorization and behavioral outcomes.  
The current study 
 As reviewed above, research into the social cognitive processes active when viewing faces 
of Blacks and Whites suggests a host of neural and cognitive processes hinge upon the racial 
ingroup or outgroup membership of a target. This membership then can activate stereotypes that 
may bias an individual’s behavior. Other research has shown that when these stereotypes are 
violated with stereotype inconsistent information, neural processes are activated which lead 
perceivers to attend more to the target. As minimal group research has shown that many neural, 
cognitive and behavioral effects that were thought to be specific to race or learned group 
membership may actually in fact reflect a basic system tuned to ingroup and outgroup 
membership, this research seeks to explore whether early neural attention to a mixed-race 
minimal group will supersede the effects found previously in studies of neural attention to racial 
faces that violate expectancies. In the current study, we used Dickter and Gyurovski’s (2012) 
racial expectancy violation paradigm in an attempt to replicate their effects and to extend it to 
examining both White and Black participants. We expect that the findings for White participants 
will replicate the original study while the data for Black participants will mirror the findings 
from White participants (Dickter & Gyurovski, 2012), with White and Black targets eliciting 
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ERPs consistent with outgroup and ingroup targets, respectively. In a second block, the paradigm 
is used in conjunction with a minimal group distinction, where participants are assigned to a 
group that contains both Black and White males and then are tested on their neural responses to 
the target-sentence pairings. The focus of the current study is on the P2 component, an early 
attentional component that has been shown to be larger to racial outgroup than racial ingroup 
faces (Ito & Bartholow, 2009) and when White participants view Black target-Black stereotype 
pairings (Dickter & Gyurovski, 2012). We decided to examine the P2 it is an index of 
participants attention and offers straightforward predictions for our particular study. It is 
hypothesized that the P2 will be larger to outgroup faces relative to ingroup faces and largest 
when negative impressions are paired with minimal outgroup target faces. This result would 
suggest that a minimal group distinction can supersede race in determining early neural 
responses to targets.  
Method 
Participants 
Twenty Black and twenty White male undergraduates (Mage = 19.3 years) from the 
College of William and Mary were recruited. The men participated either for course credit in an 
introductory psychology course or for payment. All participants were healthy, with no history of 
neurological dysfunction, and right-handed, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The 
protocol was approved by the college’s ethics board and informed consent was obtained from all 
subjects.  
Stimuli and experimental paradigm 
 Impression Formation Tasks. The sentence and target face stimuli used were the same 
used by Dickter and Gyurovski (2012). The sentences were formed according to pilot studies. In 
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the first pilot study, participants (N=188) listed common American stereotypes of Black and 
White males in a free response task. The most frequently mentioned stereotypes were compiled 
and then used in the second pilot study, where participants (N=68) rated them on their 
applicability for White males and Black males. The 7-point scale ran from “not all applicable” to 
“extremely applicable.” The stereotypes that were rated most applicable for White or Black 
males were included. Any stereotypes that were rated as applicable to both Black and White 
males were excluded. A third pilot test had participants (N=49) create sentences on the basis of 
the stereotypes provided from pilot study 2. Four commonly created sentence types were used 
for each stereotype. The impression-formation sentences that resulted were distributed evenly 
among four categories: Black positive stereotype, Black negative stereotype, White positive 
stereotype and White negative stereotype.  
The picture stimuli for the impression formation tasks and for the minimal groups 
learning task consisted of 120 full-color photographs of the heads and necks of Black and White 
males with neutral facial expressions and direct eye gaze. All pictures were obtained from 
Jennifer Eberhardt and were pilot-tested to be similar in age, attractiveness and stereotypicality 
(Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns & Johnson, 2006). The sentence-face pairings consisted of 
Black positive stereotype-Black face, Black positive stereotype-White face, Black negative 
stereotype-Black face, and so on, for a total of 8 different categories of sentence-face pairings.  
The stimuli were presented using E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., 
Pittsburgh, PA, USA). One hundred twenty sentence-face pairs were used over two blocks. The 
first block included forty pairings and the second block included eighty pairings. Both blocks 
had the same design. A message was presented for 1000ms at the start of each trial which 
notified participants that the next trial was about to begin. A fixation cross in the center of the 
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screen was then presented for 500ms. The impression-formation sentence was then presented on 
the screen until participants indicated they had read it by pressing the space bar. The target face 
was then presented for 500ms. After face presentation, participants indicated by button press 
whether the target could have been the person described by the sentence. The key press was 
counterbalanced across participants. The intertrial interval varied randomly between 2000 and 
4000ms. Each face was seen only once.   
Dot Estimation Task.  Participants were presented with four screens of randomly 
distributed dots for 5s each and were asked to estimate the number of dots on each screen and 
record their answers using pen and paper. When finished, the experimenter came in, collected the 
responses and left the room briefly. Participants were then randomly assigned to be either an 
“underestimator” or an “overestimator.” The experimenter then reentered the experimental room 
and notified the participant of his categorization and provided him with a sheet of paper with the 
appropriate estimator label written on it. The participant was then presented with this message 
onscreen: “Although psychologists place no value on whether it is better to be an overestimator 
or an underestimator, individuals who underestimate tend to be similar to one another in other 
ways, just as those who overestimate tend to share a number of other characteristics” (Brown, 
Collins & Schmidt, 1988). While the message was presented, the experimenter also read the 
message to the participant to ensure he attended to the assignment. The goal of this task was to 
create an arbitrary minimal groups distinction.  
Learning Task. The word “overestimator” or “underestimator” was first presented on the 
screen for 2s indicating the group label of an individual. The next screen presented a Black or 
White male face for 3s. A series of forty Black and forty White male faces was used for a total of 
eighty faces with both races being equally distributed between the two estimator groups. These 
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faces were distinct from the ones used in the first expectancy violation block. A blank screen 
followed the presentation of the face where participants evaluated what the previously presented 
face’s group label was by a simple key press. The key press was counterbalanced across 
participants. Participants received real time feedback on their categorization of the faces, with 
“correct” in blue or “incorrect” in red appearing in the center of the screen for 1.5s. This learning 
block was designed to have participants learn the categorization of the faces (over vs. under), 
establishing a minimal in- and outgroup as a result. The immediate evaluation of the targets’ 
group label was to ensure that participants were attending to the faces and the feedback was to 
motivate participants to provide correct responses.  
Memory Task. Participants were tested on their recall of the faces used in the training 
task and second expectancy block. Each face was presented onscreen for 1000 ms during which 
participants had to respond with a simple key press to indicate the estimator group the face 
belonged to. They received immediate feedback on their responses: a blue “correct!” or red 
“incorrect” appeared in the center of the screen for 1500 ms.   
Procedure 
Upon arrival, participants were asked to fill out a consent form. Participants were then 
seated roughly 70 cm away from the computer screen in an electrically shielded Faraday cage. 
Electrodes were then attached and tested. Participants were asked to sit as still as possible and to 
minimize eye blinks during the experiment to reduce noise in the EEG data.  The first block 
began after presentation of instructions and included forty sentence-face pairings. On average it 
took participants 5 minutes to complete this first block. After completion of the trials in the first 
block, participants completed the dot estimation task, which took roughly a minute to finish. 
After being presented with their estimator classification and reading the onscreen message on its 
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significance, participants pressed the spacebar to continue. Participants then completed the 
learning portion of the minimal group assignment. On average, participants took roughly 8 
minutes to complete this task. The next block shared the same design as the first expectancy 
block, except the faces this time were the same from the training task and the impression 
formation sentences were different from the first expectancy block, for a total of 80 unique 
sentence-face pairs.  After completion of this block, which took approximately 10 minutes, 
participants were tested on their memory of the trained faces. Participants then had the EEG cap 
removed.  Participants were then debriefed on the nature of the study and thanked for their 
participation.  
Electrophysiological recording and analysis  
 EEG data were recorded with a DBPA-1 Sensorium Bioamplifier (Sensorium, Inc., 
Charlotte, VT, USA) with an analog high-pass filter of 0.01 Hz and a low- pass filter of 500 Hz 
(four-pole Bessel). The EEG was recorded from 74 Ag-AgCl sintered electrodes in an electrode 
cap, placed with the expanded International 10–20 electrode placement system. All electrodes 
were referenced to the tip of the nose, and the ground electrode was placed in the middle of the 
forehead, slightly above the eyebrows. Eye movement and blinking were recorded from bipolar 
electrodes placed on the lateral canthi and perioccular electrodes on the superior and inferior 
orbits, aligned with the pupils. Before data collection was initiated, all impedances were adjusted 
to within 0–20 kilohms. EEG was recorded continuously throughout the computer task, and was 
analyzed off-line by EMSE software (Source Signal Imaging, San Diego, CA, USA). Data were 
undersampled at 500 Hz. The data were corrected for eye-movement artifacts, using independent 
component analysis (Jung, Makeig, Westerfield, Townsend, Courchesne, & Sejnowski 2000). 
Channels containing extreme values (± 300 mV) in more than 40% of the sweeps were spatially 
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interpolated. All EEG data were filtered (FIR) at low-pass 20 Hz (Luck, 2005). The data were 
segmented between 200 ms prior to stimulus onset and 1000 ms post-stimulus onset. After 
baseline correction over the pre-stimulus interval, segmented data was averaged for each subject 
in each of the conditions (Fabiani, Gratton, & Federmeier, 2007; Luck, 2005). Sample-wide 
ERPs were identified from the grand-averaged waveforms. 
Results 
 Visual inspection of grand-averaged waveforms was used to identify epochs for the 
component of interest, as well as to determine scalp locations where neural activation was 
maximal. For the purposes of investigating the ERP component that is of most theoretical 
interest to the current research question, we chose to focus on just the P2 component in the 
analyses below. The P2 component was largest at the Pz (parietal midline) electrode, and was 
quantified as the average voltage between 170 and 300 ms at that electrode.  
 The data collected from four participants were not included due to excessive noise in the 
EEG recording. One other participant was rejected because of data recording failure. Thus, EEG 
data analysis was conducted with nineteen White participants and sixteen Black participants. In 
order to examine the neural effects of minimal group assignment and race on stereotype-
consistent and -inconsistent conditions, a 2 (Group Membership: Underestimator, Overestimator) 
x 2 (Target Race: Black, White) x 2 (Stereotype Race: Black, White) x 2 (Stereotype Valence: 
Positive, Negative) x 2 (Race: Black, White) x 2 (Group: Underestimator, Overestimator) mixed 
model ANOVA was conducted with repeated measures on the first four factors and with P2 
amplitude as the dependent variable. 
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 Results revealed a marginal three-way interaction of Stereotype Congruence x Valence x 
Participant Group, F(1,34)=3.29, p=.080, η2=.099. This interaction was not significant and not of 
theoretical interest so we did not explore this interaction further. 
 The analyses showed a marginally significant three-way interaction of Target Race x 
Stereotype Congruence x Participant Race, F(1,34)=3.36, p=.077, η2=.101. Follow-up tests were 
conducted to understand the interaction. First, separate repeated measures ANOVAs for Target 
Race x Stereotype Congruence were conducted separately for Black and White participants. For 
Black participants, analyses revealed a significant main effect of Target Race, F(1,15)=6.10, 
p=.026, η2=.289. A paired samples t-test revealed larger mean amplitudes to White targets (M= 
2.64, SE=1.15) relative to Black targets (M=1.89, SE=1.16), t(15)=-2.52, p=.025. For White 
participants, there was a marginal Target Race x Stereotype Congruence interaction, 
F=(1,18)=3.33, p=.085, η2=.156. To examine this interaction further, paired samples t-tests 
showed that White Target-Stereotype Congruent trials (M=5.69, SE=1.81) elicited larger mean 
amplitudes than did Black Target-Stereotype Congruent (M=3.79, SE=1.28) pairings, although 
this difference was not significant, t(17)=-1.57, p=.133. There were no differences between the 
White and Black targets in the Incongruent conditions. 
 Results also showed a significant three-way interaction between Target Race x 
Participant Race x Participant Group, F(1,34)=5.85 p=.022, η2=.163. Additional repeated 
measures ANOVA were conducted for White and Black participants separately. For White 
participants there was a significant Target Race x Participant Group interaction, F(1,18)=5.94, 
p=.026, η2=.259. White Underestimator and Overestimator participants were then analyzed 
separately. For White Underestimator participants, White targets (M=6.48, SE=2.51) elicited a 
larger P2 than Black targets (M=3.19, SE=1.83), although this was not significant, t(8)=-1.76, 
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p=.116. For White Overestimator Participants, Black targets (M=5.43, SE=1.93) elicited a larger 
P2 than White targets (M=4.01, SE=1.93), although this was also only marginally significant, 
t(9)=1.90, p=.090. For Black participants, there was a main effect of Target Race, F(1,15)=6.47, 
p=.023, η2=.316, such that White Targets (M=2.64, SE=1.15) elicited larger amplitudes than 
Black Targets (M=1.89, SE=1.16), t(15)=-2.52, p=.025.  
 Analyses also revealed a significant four-way interaction between Target Group x 
Valence x Participant Race x Participant Group, F(1,35)= 4.561, p=.041, η2=.132. Repeated 
measures ANOVAs were then carried out for Overestimator and Underestimator participants 
separately. For Overestimator participants, analyses showed a Target Group x Valence x 
Participant Race effect, although this effect did not reach significance F(1,18)=2.91, p=.107, 
η2=.154. Further repeated measures ANOVAs were done for Black and White Overestimator 
participants separately. There were no significant effects found for Black Overestimator 
participants. For White Overestimator participants, there was a significant effect of Valence, 
F(1,10)=5.12, P=.05, η2=.363, which was qualified by an interaction of Target Group x Valence, 
although this effect was not significant, F(1,10)=2.80, p=.129, η2=.237. There were no 
significant effects for participants who had been assigned as Underestimators.  
 A significant five-way interaction of Target Race x Target Group x Stereotype 
Congruence x Participant Race x Participant Group was also found. Additional repeated 
measures ANOVAs were conducted for Underestimator and Overestimator participants 
independently. For Underestimators, there was a significant Target Race x Target Group x 
Participant Race interaction, F(1,17)=5.59, p=.032, η2=.271. Black and White Underestimator 
participants were then subjected to separate repeated measures ANOVAs. No significant effects 
were found for Black Underestimator participants. For White Underestimator participants, a 
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repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant Target Race x Target Group Membership 
effect, F(1, 9)=11.97, p=.009, η2=.599, which was not of theoretical interest and therefore not 
explored further. For Overestimator participants, there was a significant Target Race x 
Participant Race interaction, F(1,18)=8.01, p=.012, η2=.334, which was qualified by a significant 
Target Race x Target Group x Stereotype Congruence x Participant Race interaction 
F(1,18)=5.87, p=.028, η2=.268. Further repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for White 
and Black Overestimator participants. Results revealed a marginal main effect of Target Race 
among White Overestimator participants, F(1,10)=3.618, p=.09, η2=.287, such that Black 
Targets elicited a marginally larger amplitude (M=5.43, SE=1.94) than did White Targets 
(M=4.01, SE=1.94), t(9)=1.90, p=.09. For Black Overestimator participants, there were main 
effects of Target Race, F(1,8)=8.21, p=.024, η2=.54, and Stereotype Congruence F(1,8)=3.55, 
p=.102, η2=.336. These main effects were qualified by a significant Target Race x Group 
Membership x Stereotype Congruence interaction, F(1,8)=9.12, p=.019, η2=.566. Further 
analyses revealed that for Overestimator Targets, which constitute those participants’ minimal 
ingroup, there was a significant interaction of Target Race x Stereotype Congruence, 
F(1,8)=5.60, p=.05, η2=.444. A paired samples t-test showed that Stereotype Congruent Black 
Targets (M=4.61, SE=2.38) yielded a larger amplitude than Stereotype Incongruent Black 
Targets (M=1.2, SE=1.53), t(7)=2.465, p=.043. Analyses revealed no significant effects for 
White Targets. For Underestimator Targets, the minimal outgroup, there was an interaction 
between Target Race and Stereotype Congruence, F(1,8)=6.57, p=.037, η2=.484. A paired 
samples t-test showed that for White Underestimator Targets, Stereotype Congruent Targets 
(M=5.79, SE=1.16) yielded a larger amplitude than Stereotype Incongruent Targets (M=3.47, 
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SE=1.32),t(7)=2.496, p=.041. There were no significant effects for Black Underestimator 
Targets.  
Discussion 
 The current study investigated how a minimal group distinction can alter early attentional 
differences to race as a function of stereotypic expectancies. Our hypothesis that minimal group 
affiliation would supersede race in early attention, as indexed by the amplitude of the P2 
component following an expectancy violation, was generally not supported. We did, however, 
find a number of other effects. Black participants had larger P2 amplitudes to White Targets 
relative to Black Targets, supporting previous literature that has shown the P2 component to be 
sensitive to racial outgroup members (Dickter & Bartholow, 2007). For Black Overestimator 
participants, White minimal outgroup targets who followed descriptions of White stereotypes 
elicited greater amplitudes than did White minimal outgroup targets who followed Black 
stereotype. Similarly, Dickter and Gyurovski (2012) found that for White participants Black 
stereotype-Black target pairings elicited the greatest P2 amplitude. While our expectation was 
that participants would have larger P2 amplitudes to minimal outgroup members generally, with 
those following negative impressions being the largest, this finding offers partial support for our 
hypothesis in that these White minimal outgroup targets were simultaneously in the Black 
participants’ racial and minimal outgroups and were seen as behaving congruently with racial 
outgroup stereotypes. This combination may have been a potent one for participants in 
perceiving social threat (Schutter, de Haan, & van Honk, 2004). The salience of race in this study 
may have caused for the minimal group distinction to have a combinatory, rather than a 
overriding, effect with the racial distinction. The other effects we found were difficult to 
interpret. 
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 For Black Overestimator participants, Black stereotype-Black minimal ingroup target 
pairings elicited larger amplitudes than did White stereotype-Black minimal ingroup target 
pairings. Since the amplitudes did not seem to differ based upon the valence of the stereotype, 
this finding is puzzling given previous research identifying the P2 component as an outgroup or 
social threat perception component and the targets were in both the participants minimal and 
racial ingroups (Dickter & Gyurovski, 2011; Dickter & Bartholow, 2007; Schutter, de Haan, & 
van Honk, 2004). A number of explanations could account for this discrepancy. It may be that 
Black participants in general were more tuned to the racial component of the study, shifting their 
attention or expectations in some unexpected way, or perhaps inducing increased anxiety. 
Research has shown that when minority stereotypes become salient minority group members’ 
performances on tasks worsen, possibly as a result of increased anxiety due to fear of confirming 
a stereotypical expectation (Steele & Aronson, 1995). For example, once group membership is 
established Black participants may be especially sensitive to being affiliated with Black targets 
who behave in stereotypically Black ways, eliciting a larger P2 in response to a perception of 
social threat. Anecdotally, several Black participants asked after the study about the racial nature 
of the study and their performance, whereas no White participants inquired in a similar way, 
suggesting that the racial aspect of the study was more meaningful and perhaps anxiety-inducing 
for the Black participants. Considering this in conjunction with our minimal group paradigm, 
which implicitly suggests that participants share psychological traits with targets who share their 
estimator group, Black participants may have been especially sensitive to being associated with 
racial and minimal ingroup members who behave in a stereotypical manner. It also may be that 
the racial nature of the study negatively altered the valence of all the Black stereotypic 
impressions, causing Black participants to view stereotypical Black ingroup members negatively, 
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regardless of the pilot tested valence of the stereotype. On the surface this explanation seems less 
likely however, given previous studies that have shown that participants implicitly attend to race 
regardless of task (Dickter & Bartholow, 2007), suggesting that the explanation is something 
other than a priming effect.    
 Another consideration is the assumption in our design that our Black and White 
participants identify with their racial ingroup or find racial group distinctions equally salient. It 
may be that Black individuals perceive race, and therefore race expectancy violations, in 
fundamentally different ways than White individuals. Indeed previous research has suggested 
that racial identity is more important to Blacks than Whites (Jaret & Reitzes, 1999; White & 
Burke, 1987) which implies that a racially charged study may affect Blacks and Whites in 
different ways. Future analysis should examine neural responses in the first expectancy block 
prior to the introduction of a minimal group differentiation to better understand Black 
participants’ responses to racial expectancy confirmations and violations. In addition, future 
research could correlate measures that probe participants’ same race and other race experience 
and attitudes with their neural responses to expectancy violations, offering an index of early 
attentional activity in relation to racial experience and bias. Another possibility is examining the 
extent to which participants identify with or have anxiety evoked by racial stereotypes. Future 
research could also vary the race of the experimenter, given that this study used a White male to 
deliver the instructions and conduct the experiment, which may have caused a systematic 
difference in Black participants’ perceptions of the study relative to White participants. The 
experimenter bias effect, whereby the presence of an experimenter may alter the participant’s 
cognitions or affects, has been observed for years (Rosenthal, 1963). One study specifically 
investigated the effect of Black and White interviewers on the results obtained from 
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psychological assessment of Black females. The researchers found that Black females divulged 
more information to Black than White interviewers (Samples et al., 2014) suggesting that the 
race of an experimenter can significantly alter participants’ responses. While it is unclear 
whether this effect can extend to physiological responses, given the extensive interaction 
between the experimenter and participants in our study, particularly during minimal group 
assignment, the possibility of experimenter race having a differential effect on Black and White 
participants must be taken seriously.   
 Other marginal effects were found as well. Among White participants, stereotype 
congruent White targets elicited larger amplitudes than stereotype congruent Black targets. 
Although this finding was not significant, it mirrors in some ways the finding of greater P2 
amplitudes to stereotypical Black ingroup targets by Black participants. It is difficult to explain 
this finding, except to say that if this pattern is specific to the estimator expectancy block and not 
the racial expectancy block something about the introduction of this specific minimal group 
distinction altered the neural patterns in unpredictable ways. Even more confusing is that, despite 
random minimal group assignment, White Overestimator participants had larger amplitudes to 
Black targets, whereas White Underestimator participants had larger amplitudes to White targets. 
These findings offer no readily understandable pattern and are therefore currently inexplicable. 
Further analysis may offer some insight.  
 A number of different reasons could explain the lack of specific support for our 
hypothesis. One possibility is that participants suspected that they were being deceived, altering 
their responses to the task demands. Another possibility is that participants simply did not pay 
enough attention to or remember the faces in the learning task, given that they were asked to pay 
attention to and remember the estimator label for eighty faces. Future analysis could look at the 
	   27	  
patterns of correct versus incorrect responses in the learning and memory tasks in relation to the 
expectancy violation block in order to parse out any relationship of recall of the targets to P2 
amplitude.  
 It is also possible that the dot estimation paradigm is just not a salient enough group 
distinction to elicit minimal group effects, especially when race had been made salient in the first 
portion of the study. Some marker of group identity, such as t-shirt or background color, may be 
necessary for such a quickly constructed group distinction to take root. Our reasoning in using 
only the learning task to distinguish ingroup and outgroup targets was that any group effects we 
found would be all the more impressive, but it could be that the social relevance and perceptual 
salience of skin color necessitates a stronger minimal group distinction and perhaps even a visual 
cue to group affiliation. As Kurzban and colleagues noted (2001), patterns of social affiliation 
and shared appearance may both conspire to maintain race as a potent marker to group 
membership. They accounted for this by running two studies to assess the effects of group 
affiliation on memory of target race, one without a visual cue and the second one with a visual 
cue, t-shirt color. Only in the latter study did participants seem to prioritize group membership 
encoding over race, as judged by their spontaneous recall of target race (Kurzban, Tooby & 
Cosmides, 2001). Since previous research had shown that t-shirt color was not spontaneously 
encoded in the same paradigm, these results suggest that shared appearance may be an important 
condition in eliciting group affiliation, especially when the group membership is experimental 
and as minimal as ours was. Ratner & Amodio (2013) used a similar dot estimation paradigm as 
this study but in contrast used shirt color to differentiate the groups. They found that the N170, a 
component related to facial structure encoding, was larger to ingroup compared to outgroup 
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members. These researchers used only White targets, however. Future studies could use the same 
design and substitute some visual marker of shared group membership for the learning task.  
 Several limitations of the study must be noted. All participants were college-aged and -
educated men, limiting the study’s generalizability. Five participants’ data had to be excluded, 
diminishing an already small sample size. When conducting analyses to understand the observed 
interaction effects, most effects were marginal, suggesting a need for greater power. Larger 
sample sizes should increase the power of the experiment, reducing the likelihood of Type II 
error. There also seemed to be some large systematic differences among Underestimator 
participants compared to Overestimator participants. Underestimators showed much smaller 
mean amplitudes than did Overestimators, which greatly complicated the analyses. Given that 
participants were randomly assigned into one of the two categories, why this occurred is entirely 
unclear.  
 Future analysis should examine the first expectancy violation block to determine if the 
findings from Dickter and Gyurovski (2011) were replicated. Since only White participants were 
used in the original study and this study used both Black and White participants, perceiver race 
effects could also be probed. We hypothesize that in the first block, Black participants will show 
the same pattern of neural activation and behavior along racial ingroup and outgroup lines as 
White participants in Dickter and Gyurovski (2011). Greater N1 amplitudes should be observed 
in response to negative impression-Black target and positive impression-White target pairings, 
relative to positive impression-Black target and negative impression-White target pairings. The 
P2 should show greater amplitudes to White targets compared to Black targets and greater 
amplitudes to White stereotype-White target pairings relative to other combinations. The N2 
should several effects. First, it should show greater activation to Black targets than White targets. 
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Second, it should show larger amplitudes to the negative stereotype-Black target condition when 
compared to other pairings. Third, it should show larger amplitudes to White stereotype-Black 
target pairings relative to White stereotype-White target, Black stereotype-Black target and 
Black stereotype-White target pairings. Finally, reaction times should be quickest and 
participants most likely to describe the target as the actor of the behavior in conditions with no 
expectancy violation. The results from both White and Black participants in this first block 
should then be compared to the results of the second block to understand the effects of the 
minimal group assignment and learning task, as mentioned above. 
 For the minimal group block, analysis could be simplified by collapsing across target 
group membership and participant group membership to create one factor, group membership 
(e.g., ingroup, outgroup). Other participants’ data may also need to be excluded due to being 
statistical outliers. Additionally, we could analyze other attentional components for both race and 
minimal group effects.  
 The N1 has previously been implicated in engaging attentional resources and is usually 
larger to racial outgroup members (Ito & Bartholow, 2009). In a racial expectancy violation 
setting, it has been shown to be greater when a racial ingroup face followed a negative 
impression and when a racial outgroup face followed a positive impression (Dickter & 
Gyurovski, 2012). We hypothesize that this component would be larger when ingroup targets are 
coupled with negative information and when outgroup targets are coupled with positive 
information, relative to the other conditions. The N2 typically has larger amplitudes in response 
to racial ingroup faces relative to racial outgroup faces and may be related to ingroup and 
outgroup differentiation (Dickter & Bartholow, 2007). It has also been shown to be larger when a 
White face follows a Black stereotype or negative impression (Dickter & Gyurovski, 2012). 
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Similar to the N1 component, our expectation would be that participants would show a larger N2 
amplitude to ingroup members, especially when they are preceded by negative information. We 
could also look at the N170, a component related to facial structure encoding that has been 
shown to be sensitive to minimal group effects (Ratner & Amodio, 2013). We would expect that 
a larger amplitude would be found for minimal ingroup members relative to minimal outgroup 
members. The P3, thought to be an index of working memory updating, should also be 
investigated (Donchin & Coles, 1988). As it has been previously found to be larger to 
evaluatively inconsistent stimuli, especially when the stimuli is negatively valenced (Ito & 
Cacioppo, 2000), this component would be expected to be largest when there are incongruencies 
between several pieces of the presented social information (e.g., White participants viewing a 
negative Black stereotype-White ingroup member pairing). 
 The ERP amplitudes should also be analyzed in relation to participant behavior. Dickter 
and Gyurovski (2012) found that participants were most likely to report that a target could have 
performed the behavior in the impression formation sentence when there was no expectancy 
violation. We expect that participants would indicate that minimal ingroup members who are 
preceded by positive impressions could be the actor of the described behavior. We can also 
examine if P2 amplitudes in response to minimal group expectancy violations positively 
associate with reaction times (RTs). Previous work (Dickter & Gyurovski, 2012) has suggested 
that expectancy violations yield RTs than expectancy confirmations, particularly when a racial 
ingroup impression is followed by a racial outgroup target. Our expectation is that RTs will be 
longest when minimal ingroup impressions are followed by a minimal outgroup target.  
 Recall data should be examined for correlations with racial or minimal group distinctions. 
Previous work has demonstrated an own race bias in facial recall (for a review, see Meissner & 
	   31	  
Brigham, 2001) and has been interpreted as resulting from individuals’ superior perceptual 
expertise with own race faces. Other research, however, has suggested that this bias reflects basic 
group processes not specific to race (Van Bavel, Packer & Cunningham, 2008). We hypothesize 
that our participants’ memory would track the minimal group distinction, such that minimal 
ingroup members would be better remembered than outgroup members. We also predict that 
expectancy violating targets (i.e., negative stereotype-ingroup member pairing) would be 
remembered better than expectancy confirming targets, given previous literature suggesting 
expectancy violating individuals are recalled better (Stern, Marrs, Millar, & Cole, 1984) 
 This study specifically and this line of reasoning generally is important in that it 
investigates what drives our attention, categorization and subsequent behaviors in person 
perception. It also seeks to understand how group membership modulates our social expectations 
and therefore what violates them. Although many of our current findings are confusing, future 
analysis may shed more light on the active processes. We also had issues with the data from 
participants randomly assigned as Overestimators, which is currently unexplainable. We did find, 
however, that Black participants exhibited larger P2 amplitudes in response to racial outgroup 
members, supporting previous findings on the P2 (see Ito & Bartholow, 2009). We also found 
greater P2s when Black Overestimator participants viewed White stereotype-White minimal 
outgroup members relative to Black stereotype-White minimal outgroup members, supporting 
previous literature showing larger P2s to racial outgroup stereotype-racial outgroup member 
pairings (Dickter & Gyurovski, 2012) and offering partial support for our hypothesis. This study 
then found partial support for previous literature on the P2 as a racial outgroup component and 
also contributed to the already extensive and growing minimal groups literature. There were also 
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many questions raised that have not yet been answered, offering many fertile avenues for future 
analysis and research.  
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Appendix  
 Informed	  Consent	  Form	  	  Psychology	  Department	  -­‐	  College	  of	  William	  &	  Mary	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  determine	  how	  quickly	  people	  can	  make	  judgments	  about	  other	  people.	  The	  procedure	  of	  this	  study	  is	  as	  follows:	  	  First,	  several	  recording	  electrodes	  will	  be	  placed	  on	  your	  scalp	  and	  face.	  These	  electrodes	  will	  record	  the	  tiny	  electrical	  activity	  in	  your	  brain	  and	  muscles	  as	  you	  view	  and	  respond	  to	  the	  stimuli	  presented	  in	  this	  study;	  the	  electrodes	  will	  not	  be	  used	  to	  harm	  you	  in	  any	  way.	  Electrode	  gel	  will	  be	  inserted	  into	  each	  electrode	  prior	  to	  recording,	  and	  will	  need	  to	  be	  washed	  out	  of	  your	  hair	  following	  the	  session.	  This	  gel	  easily	  washes	  out	  with	  water.	  There	  are	  no	  known	  discomforts	  or	  risks	  associated	  with	  the	  response	  tasks	  in	  this	  experiment.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  you	  will	  experience	  minor	  fatigue	  during	  set	  up	  of	  the	  experiment	  (cap	  administration	  and	  preparation)	  or	  after	  the	  experiment.	  If	  you	  do	  experience	  fatigue	  during	  the	  experiment,	  please	  alert	  the	  experimenter	  and	  a	  break	  will	  given	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  	  On	  a	  computer	  screen,	  you	  will	  see	  a	  series	  of	  trials	  in	  which	  a	  series	  of	  faces	  is	  presented.	  You	  will	  complete	  several	  judgment	  tasks	  in	  which	  you	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  make	  responses	  on	  a	  keyboard	  by	  pressing	  a	  key	  depending	  on	  the	  category	  of	  a	  target	  face.	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After	  the	  computer	  tasks,	  you	  will	  fill	  out	  a	  short	  survey.	  	  Your	  privacy	  is	  important	  to	  us	  and	  we	  will	  make	  every	  effort	  to	  protect	  your	  privacy.	  An	  arbitrary	  code	  number	  has	  been	  assigned	  to	  you	  for	  this	  study	  and	  the	  link	  between	  identifying	  information	  and	  your	  data	  will	  be	  kept	  in	  a	  password-­‐protected	  database	  in	  a	  locked	  location.	  The	  results	  of	  this	  experiment	  will	  not	  be	  linked	  to	  any	  specific	  individual;	  we	  are	  only	  interested	  in	  group	  averages.	  No	  identifying	  information	  will	  ever	  be	  made	  public.	  	  Please	  read	  the	  paragraph	  below	  and	  sign	  at	  the	  bottom.	  	  The	  general	  nature	  of	  this	  study	  has	  been	  explained	  to	  me.	  I	  understand	  that	  I	  am	  participating	  in	  a	  reaction	  time	  study	  that	  will	  take	  approximately	  90	  minutes.	  I	  understand	  that	  my	  responses	  will	  be	  completely	  confidential	  and	  that	  my	  name	  will	  not	  be	  associated	  with	  any	  results	  of	  this	  study.	  I	  know	  that	  I	  do	  not	  have	  to	  participate	  in	  this	  study	  and	  that	  if	  I	  do	  choose	  to	  participate,	  I	  may	  stop	  at	  any	  time	  without	  any	  penalty.	  I	  know	  that	  I	  may	  refuse	  to	  answer	  any	  question	  asked	  and	  I	  also	  understand	  that	  any	  credit	  for	  participation	  will	  not	  be	  affected	  by	  my	  responses	  or	  by	  my	  exercising	  any	  of	  my	  rights.	  I	  am	  aware	  that	  I	  may	  report	  dissatisfactions	  with	  any	  aspect	  of	  this	  experiment	  to	  the	  Chair	  of	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Subjects	  Committee,	  Dr.	  Raymond	  McCoy,	  1-­‐855-­‐800-­‐7187,	  consent@wm.edu.	  I	  understand	  that	  I	  may	  contact	  Dr.	  Cheryl	  Dickter	  about	  this	  experiment	  to	  ask	  any	  questions	  or	  to	  obtain	  the	  results	  of	  this	  study	  after	  it	  is	  completed	  at	  757-­‐221-­‐3722	  or	  cldickter@wm.edu.	  I	  am	  aware	  that	  I	  must	  be	  at	  least	  18	  years	  of	  age	  to	  participate.	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My	  signature	  below	  signifies	  my	  voluntary	  participation	  in	  this	  project,	  and	  that	  I	  have	  received	  a	  copy	  of	  this	  consent	  form.	  	  	  	  ___________________________________________________________________	  Name	  	  	  _______________________________________________	   _______________	  Signature	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Date	  	  	  THIS	  PROJECT	  WAS	  APPROVED	  BY	  THE	  COLLEGE	  OF	  WILLIAM	  AND	  MARY	  PROTECTION	  OF	  HUMAN	  SUBJECTS	  COMMITTEE	  (Phone	  757-­‐221-­‐3966)	  ON	  2013-­‐09-­‐20	  AND	  EXPIRES	  ON	  2014-­‐09-­‐20.	  	  
 
